來自中國（國民黨政府）編造的情報：台灣人的抗日
（節錄自 葛超智著作：Formosa Betrayed
http://www.romanization.com/books/formosabetrayed/chap01.html）
珍珠港事件後，美日宣戰；敵人的敵人，中國，成為美國的盟友。 美國要求中國提供有關台灣的情報，中國居然提供編造的台灣人抗日故事。
作者葛超智（又譯柯喬治）美國外交官與臺灣-東亞事務專家，出生在美國賓夕法尼亞州。 第二次世界大戰前，他在日本讀書（1935-1937），後來在日治臺灣的臺北高等學校擔任英文教師（1937-1940）。 柯喬治在美國的海軍預備役內當中尉，並且是台灣問題專家，在第二次世界大戰時任職於美國戰爭部軍事情報總部。
Intelligence Reports--Chinese Style
Our G-2 representatives at Chungking asked for intelligence of Formosa. In due course, back through channels came long reports purporting to tell of conditions within the island, observed by Chinese agents recently returned from hazardous intelligence missions. The papers were signed, endorsed and forwarded by one or more of the thousands of Generals on the Nationalist military payroll.
The reports revealed at once how very little the mainland Chinese knew about any aspect of Formosa, and it suggested how little they cared. It also suggested that high-ranking Chinese officers did not hesitate to misrepresent field conditions to "ignorant" Americans. Obviously we were being told what the Chinese thought we wanted to know; considerations of "face" made it impossible to admit that they had no genuine recent intelligence from the island.
Several Chinese field reports began with assurances that Formosa had been discovered by the Chinese in the year A.D. 607. (dated August 17, 1943), stated that in January, 1938, the mountain aborigines had swept through the lowlands of Formosa, that there had been strikes in the mines, and that Formosans everywhere had refused to pay taxes. All this anti-Japanese resistance, they said, had been organized by Chinese underground revolutionary agents. In March, 1938, said another report, mammoth oil reserves had been destroyed by Chinese agents -- enough to meet Japan s fuel requirements for six years. In September that year Japan s plans to draft Formosans for military service had precipitated a great uprising in the southern part of the island during which twenty-seven Japanese had been killed. This had been followed by uprisings everywhere. Chinese Nationalist agents, guiding Formosan revolutionaries, had dynamited railroads and steelworks in November, after which the Japanese garrison had been trebled. Nine thousand Formosan troops had revolted after killing and wounding 1200 Japanese officers and men. The insurgents had taken to the hills, from which they were continuing to foment riots and strikes throughout the island, guided always by Chinese Nationalist agents.
At Washington I read these reports with fascination; if all this were true we should have little trouble in bringing about massive subversion of the Japanese war effort in the rich colony.
But there was a slight difficulty; I had been living on Formosa in these years (1937 to 1940) and had traveled in every part of the island. These marvelous Chinese tales were inventions, or fabrications based upon incidents -- some of them twenty years in the past-which were well known and had been reported in detail before 1941. For example, the alleged destruction of a six-year oil reserve referred to the dropping of one bomb, far wide of the mark, in the Hsinchu oilfields of North Formosa on February 18, 1938. At Chungking old reports had been elaborated and twisted to serve the intelligence requirements of the American command. Chinese face had been saved.
From Washington we persisted in requests for current information.
Chiang s highest intelligence offices supplied us with a "complete list" of twenty-one airfields and temporary landing strips on Formosa. We knew that there were in fact more than seventy.
We were then provided with a report prepared by a reconnaissance mission "just returned from Taiwan." The Chinese agents had discovered that there were five key railway bridges on the main line linking Keelung and Kaohsiung ports, and that each consisted of an upper vehicular span which concealed a lower railway deck. One steel and concrete bridge was camouflaged by having it "submerged from three inches to one foot under water." Another report from this reconnaissance mission told of an underground railway tunnel, some eighteen miles long, which linked Kaohsiung harbor with the airbase and factory town at Pingtung. The Japanese controlled only the Formosan lowlands, the report said, for they had been forced to leave the mountainous two-thirds of Formosa to the aborigines. High-ranking Allied prisoners of war (presumably General Jonathan Wainright) had been moved from Formosa to an (imaginary) island lying "one hundred miles east of Formosa."
These last two items read as if they had been reproduced from Chinese reports of the I870 s, when the Chinese themselves garrisoned only the lowlands on the western coast and Chinese geographic information concerning Formosa and the adjacent islets was wildly inaccurate.
A Chinese report prepared in late 1943 stated that a "recent visitor to Taiwan" had seen the Keelung anchorage empty of ships. Our own shipping-intelligence data, analyzed at Washington, indicated that Keelung had an average of forty-eight ships in port per week at that time, traveling under great hazard in order to keep supplies moving southward to Japan s front lines, and foodstuffs moving northward to Japan proper. American photo reconnaissance in 1944 showed a crowded harbor.
In addition to these reports on subversion potential, and on specific communications and industrial objectives, we also received from Chungking a long report on Formosan-Chinese leaders, and on Formosans who were exiles in China. This was prepared by a Formosan "exile" named Hsieh Nan-kuang, whose name will appear again and again in this narrative. Hsieh had left Formosa in the I920 s when police pressure became intolerable to many well- educated young Formosan men and women. Now -- at Chungking -- Hsieh was seeking favors from the Americans, maneuvering toward what be hoped would be a prominent role in Formosan affairs under a postwar Occupation. To this end he carefully named Formosans who had led in Home Rule Movement organizations after World War I and who were very well known and respected throughout Taiwan. He saw them as potential rivals. Some he smeared as "Pro-Japanese collaborationists," and some he labeled "communist." His analysis showed that there were thousands of Formosans-in-exile, prepared to organize for the invasion of Formosa and the post-surrender takeover. He sought large funds to support Formosan organizations then in China, but when pressed for details it became clear that most Formosans were in areas controlled by the Japanese. He was quite willing, however, to be custodian of the American dollar funds until the Formosans could be reached and made ready for post-surrender tasks.
The American research program, the published summaries of Formosa s wealth, and the preparation of more than two thousand American officers for Occupation duty on the island alerted and perhaps alarmed the ruling family and Party oligarchy at Chungking. T.V. Soong (Madame Chiang s brother) as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Sun Fo (her sister s stepson) as President of the Legislative Yuan, began to put forward demands for an immediate reversion of Formosan sovereignty to China, and added claims upon the Ryukyu Islands as well. |
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